Run in cases where the bug was triggered innocently, or where the bug is beingĮxploited maliciously.
Stack smashing detected in c string code#
With stack-smashing protection is run, the guard value cannot be changed or aīeware how you implement the stack smash detection handler: This code is only You may take such approaches with thread-local storage,Įrrno, paging, GDT, scheduling, and so on, and suddenly a bootstrap is veryĬomplex with many dependencies between language features. This approach adds code complexity and early phases where languageįeatures are not online. Guard value, perhaps written in assembly or in C but built without stack smash Is not cryptographically secure (unless you anticipate sufficiently obscure bugsĪlternatively, you could have an early phase in your code that initializes the Take advantage of the bug-discovering properties of SSP even if the guard value Not special, they are just examples of randomly generated numbers. You can do this by putting the guard value inĪ special segment that the loader knows to randomize. You should have the program loader (the bootloader in the case of Note how the secret guard value is hard-coded rather than being decided during Noreturn void _stack_chk_fail ( void ) void foo ( const char * str ) Robustly because the compiler did it itself. Optimize these checks away if you wrote them yourself, this only works * Note how buffer overruns are undefined behavior and the compilers tend to
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